@article{BonCevFla2021,
Abstract = {According to the so-called Lockean thesis, a rational agent believes a proposition just in case its probability is sufficiently high, i.e., greater than some suitably fixed threshold. The Preface paradox is usually taken to show that the Lockean thesis is untenable, if one also assumes that rational agents should believe the conjunction of their own beliefs: high probability and rational belief are in a sense incompatible. In this paper, we show that this is not the case in general. More precisely, we consider two methods of computing how probable must each of a series of propositions be in order to rationally believe their conjunction under the Lockean thesis. The price one has to pay for the proposed solutions to the paradox is what we call "quasi-dogmatism": the view that a rational agent should believe only those propositions which are "nearly certain" in a suitably defined sense.},
Author = {Stefano Bonzio and Gustavo Cevolani and Tommaso Flaminio},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Title = {How to believe long conjunctions of beliefs: probability, quasi-dogmatism and contextualism},
Url = {https://philarchive.org/rec/BONHTB-3},
Year = {In Press}}